Nice on the Srebrenica question Mladić took with him, the ICTY as a record politics cannot erase, and the leaders who made sure it will not be repeated.
Former Hague prosecutor Geoffrey Nice says he has no particularly strong thoughts or emotions after reading the news that the war criminal Ratko Mladić, sentenced to life imprisonment, has died.
"Mladić today belongs largely to history. Even in parts of the former Yugoslavia, apart from Serbia, you can find young people of student age who do not know who he is. So he is a historical figure," Nice said in an interview with Radio Free Europe (RFE).
Nice says the trial of the commander of the Army of Republika Srpska during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not differ substantially from other trials.
"That does not mean that all of them were correct, only that they were not different. The trial presents the history of events from 1992 onward and then, like many other processes for establishing responsibility for events in the former Yugoslavia, focuses on Srebrenica," Nice said.
The former Hague prosecutor, who led the case against Slobodan Milošević, says that "on the basis of the established facts it is possible to see how easily hostility between groups — in this case between republics, or parts of them, that sought to change borders — can turn into malicious intent, criminal intent and even genocidal intent on the part of people from the top to the bottom of the military and political chain of command."
"That, however, brings nothing substantially new to international humanitarian law, which was already well established," Nice believes.
Radio Free Europe: To begin, what thoughts are going through your mind now, after the death of Ratko Mladić while serving his prison sentence?
Geoffrey Nice: My first thought was that he had died and that the story was, in a sense, over — although it had in fact ended quite some time ago.
The law is what it is, and that is a fact.
Still, there is one important aspect arising from Mladić's death which some states ought to think about: how did Mladić know, on 10 and 11 July 1995, that he could enter Srebrenica and do what he did?
I am not sure that this has ever been the subject of a final and unambiguous conclusion, although there is a great deal of evidence pointing to at least part of the probably relevant background to the events.
That evidence is publicly available in various places, but with the passage of time it has never been systematically connected and placed at the centre of attention.
At the end of May 1995, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister John Major asked US President Bill Clinton to agree that air power would not be used to save Srebrenica.
Clinton's innermost team accepted that proposal on Sunday, 28 May. This is what was called the "quiet agreement" — that is, a secret arrangement.
That approach to the defence of Srebrenica was not communicated to the Dutch soldiers deployed there, nor to the Bosnian Muslims.
The question to which Mladić might have been able to give an answer — and perhaps he already gave it to someone else, I don't know — is: how did he know that he could do what he did?
Several explanations are possible: intelligence, his own assessment of the situation, or even information passed to him by someone from the West.
Now the likelihood that this question will be fully clarified is somewhat lower, because it is no longer possible to ask him [Mladić].
One can only hope that the truth will nonetheless not be lost.
'Incitement of the public to an emotional, inflammatory reaction'
RFE: Thirty years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains deeply divided, and it is clear that Mladić's death will be received in completely different ways in different communities. The leader of the largest party in Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, immediately declared that "Mladić was killed." Does this point to a failure of international justice as administered by the Hague Tribunal?
Nice: Above all, it shows the persistence of deeply entrenched attitudes, which may also be biased. We need not pay much attention to such claims — or any at all — unless they are supported by evidence.
So, what evidence does Milorad Dodik have for the claim that Mladić was killed?
We know there were requests for his release on grounds of his state of health. Given the gravity of the crimes for which he was convicted — and rightly convicted — I don't think there is much room for objection to the fact that he was transferred for treatment to, it seems to me, a UN hospital.
Therefore the claim that he was killed is merely an attempt to incite the public to an emotional, inflammatory reaction, which may be relatively easy to achieve if you are addressing an audience that already holds deeply entrenched prejudices.
One should recall that more than 25 years ago many Serbs and residents of Republika Srpska believed that Srebrenica was entirely invented.
Then, during the trial of Slobodan Milošević, part of a recording was shown — and later the entire recording — depicting the killing of six very young men in Trnovo, committed by members of the "Scorpions," a unit that answered to the Serbian chain of command.
After that, opinion changed. People began to accept that Srebrenica really was a massacre for which Serbia bore responsibility.
One of the leading Serbian politicians also took part in the commemoration in Srebrenica in 2015 — I believe it was the then president or prime minister of Serbia.
That is why I do not think such attitudes from Serbia should surprise, disturb or worry us, unless there is evidence to support them. And as far as I know, there is currently no such evidence.
RFE: How dangerous is it when politicians try to reinterpret events that have already been the subject of final court rulings?
Nice: I think that is first and foremost a question for people from the region itself.
I am an outsider, an Englishman. I would like to be something more than that, but that is simply how it is.
Understanding the vulnerability of particular areas of the former Yugoslavia and assessing the possible consequences of such phenomena are questions better discussed with people from the countries directly concerned or from neighbouring states.
I do not want to step outside the bounds of my own expertise.
The Hague Tribunal 'an invaluable source for historians'
RFE: If in 50 years the Hague Tribunal were remembered for only one thing, would you want it remembered for punishing the perpetrators or for leaving behind a legacy of truth that politics can no longer erase?
Nice: If I had to choose between those two possibilities, it would be far more important to me that a reliable and credible record remains.
Those of us who conducted the court proceedings — despite great difficulties and sometimes political pressure from outside — always strove to leave behind clean and credible evidentiary material, regardless of the pressure.
Although the judges always said they were not there to write history, they knew that in a certain sense that is exactly what they were doing.
In that respect the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an invaluable source for historians because of the enormous quantity of detailed documentation it collected.
Those records are already searchable today with standard computer tools, and with the development of artificial intelligence they will become even more accessible to researchers, who, I hope, will regard that record as reliable.
Punishing the perpetrators is an entirely separate element of any judicial mechanism. Its value is uncertain, and it is unlikely that it can deter the next war criminal.
Investigations, and perhaps the court proceedings themselves that reveal the truth, might nonetheless prevent some people from committing war crimes.
RFE: Can a court judgment by itself change collective memory, or is its role limited to establishing the facts?
Nice: Yes, judgments can become part of collective memory.
For the ordinary citizen, who perhaps has no great interest in politics beyond occasionally going to the polls, it is simpler to know — however simplified such knowledge may be — that Mladić was convicted of genocide. For example.
People can accept that information, live with it and regard it as reliable.
However, for broader social purposes than merely helping voters understand that difficult past, the detailed record of events is far more valuable.
Such a detailed record is exceptionally important, although it will much more rarely become part of a simple or simplified collective memory.
A court like The Hague would not be established today
RFE: Is international justice stronger today than in the 1990s, or are political pressures on international institutions greater than ever before?
Nice: I think there is no doubt whatsoever that the international order has weakened and that it has been deliberately undermined by several people, among them (Russian President Vladimir) Putin, (US President Donald) Trump and, to some extent, (Chinese President) Xi Jinping.
In my view, the prospects that international humanitarian law will positively influence the development of the world are considerably diminished.
We should be neither reticent nor naive when speaking about the reasons why this happened.
It happened because large states do not want to be investigated, tried or convicted by small states. More precisely, their individual leaders do not want to be subject to such a process.
It cannot be argued that the British Empire in the 19th century would not have acted just as Trump has, had institutions like the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) existed then to investigate crimes committed during colonial expansion.
The reality is that they acted out of what was visible to anyone who observed the situation more deeply — a determination to preserve their own sovereignty at any cost and to prevent any encroachment upon it.
In doing so they seriously weakened the immediate force of international humanitarian law.
RFE: If a new international court modelled on the Hague Tribunal were being founded today, what would you change in its structure?
Nice: I don't think such a court will be established today.
At present the main question is whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) will be gradually weakened or even destroyed, as some political leaders wish.
Still, since you have asked the question, I will answer it.
I believe that any new mechanism for establishing responsibility for armed conflicts — assuming the great powers would allow it — need not necessarily follow the American, English or Australian trial model, which is slow.
Equally, it should not follow the classical European inquisitorial model, which also has numerous shortcomings, as many people know.
I think an interesting and welcome solution would be a modernised inquisitorial system, adapted to today's era marked by the enormous availability of information via the internet, artificial intelligence and other technologies.
In such a system judges would have a considerably greater role and greater powers to conduct proceedings efficiently and quickly.
Source: Radio Slobodna Evropa (RFE/RL), 28 August 2026. Translated from the original.
