As the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia drifts further from resolution, questions of intent, accountability, and risk have become unavoidable. In this interview, Serbian political scientist Miloš Pavković offers a candid Belgrade-based assessment of why normalization remains structurally ambiguous, how Serbia is negotiating time rather than closure, and why the gap between political narratives and realities on the ground continues to widen.
Edited and introduced by Prof. Kadri Kryeziu | 31 December 2025
Miloš Pavković is a Serbian political scientist specializing in European affairs, EU enlargement, and Western Balkans politics, with a particular focus on the Kosovo–Serbia normalization process. He is Chief Strategist and Researcher at the European Policy Centre (CEP) in Belgrade and a member of its Governing Board. Pavković’s work examines EU mediation, hybrid regimes, democratic governance, and the political limits of dispute resolution in Southeast Europe. He is a frequent commentator in regional and international media and a contributor to policy debates on Serbia’s EU path and regional security.
For more than a decade, the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue has been described as a process moving forward without resolution—rich in agreements, poor in outcomes. From Pristina, the frustration is increasingly existential: a normalization process that does not deliver sovereignty feels indistinguishable from managed stagnation. From Belgrade, the same process is framed as pragmatic engagement without crossing the political red line of recognition.
This divergence is not accidental. It reflects two incompatible understandings of what normalization is meant to achieve—and whether it is meant to end at all.
Miloš Pavković represents a generation of Serbian analysts who approach the dialogue not through nationalist rhetoric, but through institutional logic: incentives, constraints, and political feasibility inside Serbia. His perspective matters precisely because it is sober, structured, and revealing of how Belgrade’s policy community interprets ambiguity—not as failure, but as a condition to be managed.
In this interview for The Kosovo Dispatch, we do not seek diplomatic language or carefully balanced formulations. We ask directly whether Serbia is negotiating normalization or negotiating time; whether democratic accountability has been deferred indefinitely; and whether Serbian society is being prepared—or protected—from the reality of Kosovo as a consolidated political fact. We also confront the question most often avoided: whether the risk of renewed conflict is truly contained, or merely postponed.
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From Belgrade, normalization is often framed as a process without recognition. From Pristina, it increasingly looks like a process without sovereignty. At what point does avoiding recognition stop being diplomacy and start becoming a strategy of permanent ambiguity?
Pavković: Rather than a deliberate strategy on the Serbian side, the ambiguity is mainly reflected in the incompatibility between what Serbia and Kosovo expect from the normalisation process. For Belgrade, recognition of Kosovo's independence has never been the goal of the dialogue. Especially without the establishment of the ASM, it is difficult to imagine that the issue of recognition could even enter the political debate. On the contrary, for Pristina, mutual recognition is the only viable/desirable outcome. Ambiguity, therefore, is not a tactical choice but rather a structural condition of the process.
Serbia claims commitment to EU membership while explicitly rejecting one of the EU’s core political premises: acceptance of existing borders. Why should Brussels continue to treat Serbia as a credible accession candidate under those conditions?
Pavković: Brussels continues to treat Serbia as a credible candidate because the accession process has never been formally conditional on the de jure recognition of Kosovo's independence, but rather on the normalisation of relations. This approach is also clearly evident in the Agreement on Path to Normalisation (Ohrid Agreement), which aims to improve bilateral relations without directly addressing the status issue. If you take a look at the 1972 Basic Treaty between two Germanies, you will find a lot of similarities to Ohrid Agreement. East and West Germany never recognised each other, but the 1972 agreement enable de facto recognition and normal functioning.
You have written about “divergent narratives” in Serbia and Kosovo. Isn’t the deeper problem that Belgrade’s narrative is structurally incompatible with any final settlement—by design rather than misunderstanding?
Pavković: Belgrade's narrative reflects a clear political choice: normalisation without recognition. In this context, any agreement that implies some form of recognition of Kosovo's independence (particularly de jure) is politically impracticable. This is not so much a result of a misunderstanding of the process, but rather a conscious choice regarding the extent to which Belgrade is willing to compromise. The only realistic room for manoeuvre for the EU as a mediator seems to be to focus on the full implementation of the ASM as a possible lever to obtain at least a form of de facto recognition in return. Serbia showcased a goodwill for de facto recognition by accepting Kosovo licence plates and IDs in December 2023. Therefore, I believe that the road towards final settlement should be paved with building mutual trust and making progressive steps towards full normalisation. Then, when the time is ripe, comprehensive legally binding agreement should be signed.
The Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities is presented in Serbia as a technical minority-rights instrument. Why does Belgrade refuse to acknowledge that, in Kosovo, it is widely perceived as a sovereignty-altering mechanism rather than a neutral governance tool?
Pavković: Belgrade insists on a technical interpretation of the ASM because it considers it primarily an obligation arising from the agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue. For Serbia, the issue of the ASM (its establishment and competences) is non-negotiable, as the relevant agreements have already been signed by Kosovo. Let me remind you that Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013 by Kosovo government and ratified by the parliament with 2/3 majority.
After the Banjska attack in 2023, Serbian analysts described escalation risks as “moderate.” From Kosovo’s perspective, that assessment feels detached from reality. Do policy circles in Belgrade systematically downplay violence when it aligns with Serbia’s political objectives?
Pavković: I would not speak of a “systematic” downplaying of violence, but rather a different interpretation of risk. In Belgrade, many analysts measure escalation in terms of open war or regional crisis, and therefore define as “moderate” anything that does not alter the overall strategic balance. This does not mean that the potential for violence and instability in Kosovo is low. On the contrary, one of key findings of my study you mentioned earlier reveals high potential for conflict. Furthermore, the latest US Security Strategy mentions avoided Kosovo-Serbia war in one of its opening pages.
Belgrade often accuses Pristina of acting “unilaterally.” Yet Serbia orchestrated the mass withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, encouraged parallel structures, and then blamed Kosovo for institutional breakdown. On what analytical basis does Serbia still claim the moral high ground?
Pavković: The key point is that when and if Pristina acts unilaterally, Belgrade tends to respond symmetrically. The EU has been clear on this: both sides, by different means, have contributed to increasing tensions in the north of Kosovo. It is significant that the Serb List then decided to return to institutions after the local elections on 12 October, implicitly recognising that its withdrawal had weakened the Serbs' political representation and exacerbated the institutional vacuum.
Additionally, the qualification that Serbia orchestrated mass withdrawal of Serbs from institutions is disputable. I’ll rather describe it as genuine move of Kosovo Serbs initiated locally and only later supported by Belgrade, not imposed above as many think in Kosovo.
Is the EU-facilitated dialogue failing because Brussels lacks leverage—or because Serbia has learned that strategic ambiguity, combined with geopolitical hedging toward Russia and China, carries few tangible costs?
Pavković: Serbia can afford to remain ambiguous mainly because the EU-facilitated dialogue does not provide sufficiently attractive incentives or credible costs in the event of a stalemate. Brussels currently lacks operational tools capable of rewarding implementation or penalising non-compliance. In this context, Belgrade has learned that strategic ambiguity is sustainable and rarely sanctioned. The geopolitical balance towards Russia and China further reinforces this assessment, reducing dependence on the EU and lowering the political price of failure to move forward. Finally, Serbia’s multivector foreign policy (based on 4 pillars: Washington, Brussels, Moscow and Beijing) was formalised in 2006-2008 and since then actively maintained.
You research hybrid regimes. Where does Serbia belong today: a democracy temporarily stalled by unresolved national questions—or a hybrid system that instrumentalizes the Kosovo issue to justify internal democratic regression?
Pavković: Serbia today is closer to a hybrid system than to a democracy simply “on hold”. Unresolved national issues, including Kosovo, are increasingly being used as a political resource to justify the concentration of power, the reduction of pluralism and the control of public space. This does not mean that Kosovo is the cause of democratic regression, but that it is being exploited to normalise illiberal practices. But I have to say that the democratic seed has been sewed in Serbia with ongoing student and civic protest. I am hopeful that democratic renewal is upcoming in Serbia.
From Belgrade, Kosovo elections are often dismissed as unrealistic or symbolic. Yet Serbia has not held a referendum, a serious parliamentary debate, or an open public reckoning on Kosovo in more than a decade. Who, then, is avoiding democratic accountability?
Pavković: Kosovo occupies a special place in Serbian political discourse, where it assumes an identity function that tends to remove it from democratic debate. This makes it possible to avoid direct public debate on costs, compromises and ultimate objectives. Consequently, the accountability deficit is primarily the result of a highly centralised decision-making process.
I would also like to point out that in 2017 President Vucic organised “Internal Dialogue on Kosovo”, which did not bare any significant results. Additionally, there were several parliamentary debates in the National Assembly in last years, but all of them were inconclusive, with some turning into a ‘circus’.
Let us be direct: is Serbia still negotiating normalization—or is it negotiating time, betting on EU fatigue, Western fragmentation, and a frozen conflict that never fully resolves?
Pavković: As things stand, Serbia is now also negotiating time. It is participating in the dialogue to manage relations with Kosovo, reduce international pressure and keep the European channel open, but also to postpone definitive decisions. In this sense, time is a component that exploits the absence of binding deadlines and immediate costs for the stalemate. But it does not mean that there is no normalisatio at all. On the contrary, there are many significant elements (such as recognition of licence plates and IDs) which indeed represent normalisation.
Serbian officials frequently say renewed conflict is “unlikely” or “not in anyone’s interest.” History suggests wars rarely start because they are rational. What concrete indicators would convince you that the risk of renewed conflict is no longer theoretical?
Pavković: Even taking into account an inevitable margin of unpredictability, conflict appears unlikely, as any escalation in Kosovo would imply direct confrontation with NATO. This deterrent is fully understood in Belgrade and continues to function as a structural constraint on escalation.
Is there a dangerous gap between how security risks are assessed by elites in Belgrade and how those risks are experienced on the ground in northern Kosovo? And if such a gap exists, who is responsible for maintaining it?
Pavković: This question should be posed to security experts. For me personally, whenever I travel to north of Kosovo all I see are military checkpoints, bases and visible presence of security personnel. It looks like Kosovo is preparing for full-fledged invasion. On the other hand, I did not observe such a military build-up on the Serbian side, nor there is a war rhetoric at the moment. Although we have a campaign of graffiti “Kad se vojska na Kosovo vrati“ (“When the Army returns to Kosovo”) across Serbia, the topic of Kosovo has since disappeared from public discourse.
Be honest: does the average Serbian citizen today truly understand that Kosovo is a consolidated political reality—with functioning institutions, security forces, and growing international integration—or is Serbian society still being deliberately shielded from that reality by its leadership?
Pavković: To a large extent, no. Serbian society is not in a position to fully engage with Kosovo as a consolidated political entity. You see that even Serbs living in Kosovo only partially integrate and use Kosovo institutions, while primary relying on Serbian ones.
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Editorial Comment | Reading Between the Lines
What Miloš Pavković tells us—carefully, analytically, and at times inadvertently—is that the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue is no longer a process aimed at resolution, but a system designed to manage incompatibility. His answers confirm that ambiguity is not a temporary malfunction but a structural feature of the framework itself. Serbia, by his own account, has no political pathway toward recognition, while the EU has deliberately constructed a model of “normalization without status” that allows this contradiction to persist. The result is a dialogue that produces incremental technical adjustments—licence plates, IDs, administrative coordination—while indefinitely deferring the core political question. This is not diplomacy moving slowly; it is diplomacy deliberately circling its own limits.
For Kosovo, the message is sobering. Pavković’s responses make clear that Belgrade’s policy community does not view normalization as a linear road toward mutual recognition, but as a managed equilibrium in which time itself becomes leverage. Kosovo’s sovereignty concerns over the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities are acknowledged only procedurally, not politically. More tellingly, responsibility for instability in the north is framed as diffuse and symmetrical, even as Belgrade’s role is minimized and reframed as reactive or locally driven. Between the lines, this signals a hard truth for Pristina: within the current EU framework, Kosovo will continue to be asked to consolidate statehood while accommodating a process that structurally resists closure.
For the European Union, the implications are even more uncomfortable. Pavković openly concedes that strategic ambiguity works because it carries few costs. The EU lacks credible enforcement mechanisms, binding deadlines, or political will to impose consequences for stagnation. In this environment, Serbia can negotiate time, hedge geopolitically, and manage pressure without resolving fundamentals. Deterrence—via NATO—may be preventing war, but it is not producing peace. If the dialogue continues in its current form, the EU risks normalizing a permanent interim: a frozen political conflict masked by technical progress. The future of the process, as revealed here, depends less on new agreements than on whether Brussels is willing to confront the limits of a model that avoids recognition, avoids accountability, and increasingly avoids its own credibility.
